

DD/S 70-0210

20 JAN 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : Security Committee - Unauthorized Disclosure in  
the Foreign Weapons/Space Development Field

1. I have read your papers relating to this subject and your proposal for a broader charter to review the unauthorized disclosure field. I know you have given this considerable thought but I have one suggestion you might take under advisement.
2. There is a great deal of information in the compartmented systems relating to weapons/space which has received wide circulation in Government and is now considered as being not particularly sensitive. I think you will find that a good portion of this has also reached public media in one form or another, for certainly it has been discussed in general terms publicly. I believe that the really sensitive items that are so revealing develop from our latest "finds" and for a short time become critical issues until their purpose and definition have been established. These same elements of information or "finds" are also of extreme interest to the Congressional committees, to the Disarmament talks and also have a relationship to the SALT talks.. These sensitive elements of information or "finds" can be readily noted by DD/S&T as something new and unusual and need to have extra security protection until the problem is resolved. I suggest that these be given a special identification with special controls on a temporary basis until they are resolved for protective purposes. This would assure better handling than simply classifying them in the system where they can quickly lose their sensitive identification along with a mass of other information floating around in that same system. This may be just a gimmick approach but certainly it would permit concentration on that which is truly sensitive as against the mass of information in the basic system much of which has lost its sensitivity and in some cases is being publicly discussed.

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[Redacted]  
K. N. Bannerman  
Deputy Director  
for Support

BYE-5293-70  
Copy 1 of 1  
29 January 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : Compartmented Security Systems


1. The attached suggestion by the Special Security Center is mechanically and procedurally workable; however, some broad considerations involving compartmented security should be given some thought.

2. Over the years, there has been a liberal amount of hostility expressed against the TALENT and BYEMAN compartmented systems. Some of the more serious objections surround the following points:

- a. Important intelligence is so restricted in the community as to prevent its full benefit to the nation.
- b. The system is too complicated.
- c. Too much manpower is being expended.

3. In order to meet some of the criticism, we have tried over the years to combine as many as possible compartments so as to simplify the system. We have been only partially effective in this effort. The continued existence of the BYEMAN and TALENT systems has been challenged to almost the point of extinction on several occasions. To add another subsystem to the TALENT-KEYHOLE complex, in the face of these broad considerations, would, I believe, be inadvisable at this time. I believe it would be particularly inadvisable for the Agency, which has created these complex systems, to add further compartments in the face of the existing image of compartmented security.

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BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE  
CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

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4. There is considerable doubt as to whether the addition of another compartment would prevent the type of disclosures which are of concern. The number of clearances in the community for access would be so large as to minimize the effectiveness of further compartmentation.

5. It is entirely possible that the proposed concept may be strongly pushed in the Security Committee. On balance, however, I believe that we, who are responsible for security policy advice in NRO matters, should not propose it.

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[Redacted]  
Deputy Director of Security

Attachment

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BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE  
CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

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[redacted]  
Copy 1 of 2

21 January 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : Mr. Bannerman's Memorandum,  
20 January 1970

1. Mr. Bannerman suggests that sensitive items be given a special identification with special control on a temporary basis. The current security systems lend themselves to the adoption of such controls without complicated modifications. In example, the NSA routinely places sensitive items in sub-series of the COMINT Control System. This very effectively limits distribution. It is believed that the same procedure can be adopted in the COMIREX for the protection of our latest "finds".

2. The following is offered as a proposal which you might discuss in answering Mr. Bannerman's suggestion. The NSA would be requested to compartmentalize information on foreign weapons / space development for a period of 30 days. The hold-down would be automatically removed within 30 days unless the time limit was extended. This procedure would eliminate the need for formal downgrading. A similar procedure can be established within the TALENT System to protect photography, ELINT [redacted] related to this sensitive area of foreign weapons and space development.

3. While it is believed appropriate for the Security Committee to recommend such procedures it is not believed appropriate to invest in a CIA component such as the DD/S&T authoritative policy binding on the community in the selection of items to be placed in this hold-down category. The SIGINT

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Committee and the COMIREX have appropriate Working Groups concerned with sanitization and downgrading. These Working Groups would appear to be an existing mechanism if granted the authority to perform the functions desired at the community level.

4. This suggestion is set forth as an uncoordinated concept which might be saleable to the community.

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Chief, Special Security Center